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Conviction, Nullification, and 
the Limits of Impeachment  
as Politics 
J. Richard Broughton† 
Abstract 
The election of Donald Trump to the American presidency has 
brought with it controversies that have prompted serious talk about 
presidential impeachment. Even if an impeachment of President 
Trump never comes to fruition, the national conversation about it has 
revived the need for serious study of presidential impeachment—the 
kind of serious study that took place twenty years ago during and 
after President Clinton’s impeachment. This Article contributes to the 
revival of academic literature on this subject by exploring the insti-
tutional role of the Senate as a court of impeachment. It gives atten-
tion to the Constitution’s mandate that the Senate decide whether the 
impeached Party should be “convicted”—a term that is used else-
where in the Constitution and always in the criminal law context. 
Combined with other attributes of impeachment found in the consti-
tutional text and historical understandings, the requirement of a “con-
viction” before removal helps give impeachment a criminal justice 
character that mitigates, though does not destroy, its political 
character. Accordingly, this Article argues that the political character 
of impeachment is often overstated. The Senate is transformed into 
something different than a conventional political or legislative body. 
This Article therefore considers various approaches to deciding wheth-
er to convict, including one that views the Senator simply as finder of 
factual guilt, one that combines a finding of factual guilt with a legal 
finding that the offense is constitutionally impeachable, and another 
approach that separates the normative value of removal from the 
factual and legal conclusions. The Article further argues that consider-
ations of raw partisanship or electoral politics as a basis for acquittal 
are akin to a form of nullification similar to that found in the criminal 
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law. In light of the quasi-criminal–quasi-judicial role that the Senate 
plays as a court of impeachment, the importance of presidential 
responsibility, and the need to protect the legitimacy of the Senate 
and impeachment as a constitutional defense mechanism, the Senate 
should be just as wary of partisan or politically-motivated acquittals, 
whether overt or covert, as it should be of partisan or politically-
motivated convictions. 
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Introduction 
Impeachment talk is in the air. Again. To varying degrees of 
seriousness, it has reared its head at various points over the past 
twenty years.1 But Donald Trump’s election to the presidency has 
revived serious impeachment conversation in the country, even if a 
Trump impeachment seems, for the moment at least, relatively 
unlikely. His ascendancy to the Oval Office brought with it concerns  
 
1. See Emma Roller, A Brief History of GOP Calls for Obama’s 
Impeachment, From Benghazi to Bergdahl, Atlantic (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/a-brief-history-of-gop-
calls-for-obamas-impeachment-from-benghazi-to-bergdahl/455544/ [https:// 
perma.cc/US7H-ZNLS]; Impeaching John Andrew Koskinen, Commissioner 
of the Internal Revenue Service, For High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 
H.R. Res. 494, 114th Cong. (2015); Impeaching John Andrew Koskinen, 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, For High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 828, 114th Cong. (2016).  
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about his private business dealings and his ability to comply with the 
Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause;2 about his campaign’s 
alleged connections to efforts by the Russian government to influence 
the 2016 presidential election in Trump’s favor;3 his decision to fire 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and subsequent 
statements that led some to wonder whether that action was an effort 
to obstruct justice;4 and speculation that he may be planning a way to 
fire, or thwart the work of, Special Counsel Robert Mueller.5 All of this 
has provided fodder for an increasingly robust rhetoric of presidential 
impeachment.6 Indeed, the phrase “constitutional crisis” has been ut-
tered by many a commentator of late.7 
 
2. See Adam Liptak, Donald Trump’s Business Dealings Test a 
Constitutional Limit, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/politics/donald-trump-conflict-of-interest.html 
[https://perma.cc/L8R7-E5YC]; Complaint, Citizens for Responsibility and 
Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 
2017) (alleging that the President has violated the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause). But see Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, Yes, Trump 
Can Accept Gifts, N.Y. Times (July 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/07/13/opinion/trump-france-bastille-emoluments.html [https:// 
perma.cc/2T6X-85WK] (arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
does not apply to the President or any other elected official). 
3. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein & Kyle Cheney, Senators Alarmed by Russian 
Influence on U.S. Politics, Politico (July 26, 2017), http://www.politico. 
com/story/2017/07/26/senators-russia-influence-us-politics-240983 [https:// 
perma.cc/7883-KVKN]. 
4. See Charlie Savage, Trump, Comey and Obstruction of Justice: A Primer, 
N.Y. Times (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/ 
us/politics/obstruction-of-justice-trump-comey.html [https://perma.cc/8JU 
B-3PTL]. 
5. See Peter Beinart, Why Trump Might Fire Robert Mueller, Atlantic 
(July 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/ 
why-trump-might-fire-robert-mueller/534732/ [https://perma.cc/7UB4-
BWLF]. Notably, the President seemed to leave open this possibility in a 
recent interview with the Wall Street Journal. See Josh Dawsey & Hadas 
Gold, Full Transcript: Trump’s Wall Street Journal Interview, Politico 
(Aug. 1, 2017, 6:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/01/ 
trump-wall-street-journal-interview-full-transcript-241214 [https://perma.cc/ 
B27K-RF3V] (stating that Trump said he has “no comment yet, because 
it’s too early. But we’ll see.”). 
6. Consider, for example, the legal academic blogging on the matter. See Frank 
O. Bowman, III, Impeachable Offenses?, https://impeachableoffenses. 
net/ [https://perma.cc/XB9S-8APV]; see also Removal from Office, 
Take Care Blog, https://takecareblog.com/other-topics/removal-from-
office [https://perma.cc/E6HL-G9RP]; Conor Friedersdorf, The Case for 
Impeaching Trump If He Fires Robert Mueller, Atlantic (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/impeach-donald-
trump-if-he-fires-robert-mueller/534585/ [https://perma.cc/G7XC-LX7M] 
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The subject of impeachment more broadly is a subject that, of 
course, overwhelmed the literature two decades ago. Perhaps we 
learned some important lessons. Perhaps we thought that the 
experience of the Clinton impeachment made it less likely that im-
peachments would form a significant part of the business of future 
Congresses. Perhaps we believed that public officials would be more 
careful about their official behavior. Perhaps we hoped that Congress 
learned a harsh lesson about public perceptions of partisan impeach-
ments.8 
But the Trump presidency seems to have reignited interest in 
impeachment. Perhaps, then, the Trump presidency has reminded 
lawyers and legal scholars that we must not give up on impeachment 
as a serious area of scholarly inquiry. Congress, after all, has not for-
gotten about impeachment. Impeachment talk has not been all bark 
and no bite. Within the past decade, the Senate has convicted a fed-
eral judge—Thomas Porteus of Louisiana—on articles of impeach-
ment,9 and had planned a trial on the articles of impeachment that 
 
(arguing that the House “should immediately impeach the president” if he 
fires Mueller). 
7. See, e.g., Is This a Constitutional Crisis?, Politico (May 9, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/09/comey-trump-firing-is-
this-a-constitutional-crisis-215118 [https://perma.cc/N8GW-NKHD]; see also 
Allan Smith, Democrats Warn of ‘Constitutional Crisis’ as Trump 
Publicly Humiliates Own Attorney General, Bus. Insider (July 25, 2017, 
5:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/democrats-fear-constitutional-
crisis-as-trump-steps-up-attacks-on-sessions-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/5SW 
3-D7ZA]; Gregory Krieg, What’s a Constitutional Crisis—and Are We in 
One?, CNN Politics (Jan. 31, 2017, 11:00 PM) http://www.cnn. 
com/2017/01/31/politics/trump-executive-order-constitutional-crisis/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/3ELL-FG9H]. Cf. Uri Friedman, America Isn’t 
Having a Constitutional Crisis, Atlantic (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/constitutional-crisis-
trump-comey/526089/ [https://perma.cc/93YZ-S6B4] (citing sources that 
urge caution about the term “constitutional crisis,” but warning that such 
a crisis could arise). 
8. For evaluation of the perception that the Clinton impeachment was 
strictly partisan, see Nicol C. Rae & Colton C. Campbell, 
Impeaching Clinton: Partisan Strife on Capitol Hill 1 (2003). See 
also Richard K. Neumann Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan 
Political Weapon, 34 Hastings Const. L. Q. 161, 232 (2007). According 
to a collection of CNN, USA Today, and Gallup polls, most Americans 
believed that President Clinton should not be removed and that the two 
parties in Congress would fight over impeachment rather than cooperate 
with one another. Keating Holland, Poll: Strong Majority Do Not Want 
Clinton Removed from Office, CNN (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.cnn. 
com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/01/11/poll/ [https://perma.cc/239K-
AMMX]. 
9. 156 Cong. Rec. S8,607–11 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2010). 
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the House approved against District Judge Samuel Kent of Texas, 
before Judge Kent resigned instead.10 Of course, perhaps judicial im-
peachments raise somewhat different concerns than presidential ones.11 
But the point is that these judicial impeachments show that Congress 
still knows how to employ impeachment under the right circum-
stances, and not merely as a weapon for partisan advantage or 
embarrassment of political opponents. Still, we know that the extreme 
partisanship that prevails in the modern Congress can influence 
impeachment work.12 For example, where the president and congres-
sional majorities represent different parties, extremes in partisanship 
could make impeachment of a president, or a presidential appointee, a 
real possibility.13 By the same token, such extreme partisanship could 
make it unlikely, if not virtually impossible, to impeach a president 
when he is of the same party as the House majority, or to convict him 
when he shares a political affiliation with the Senate majority. 
Perhaps, then, though there are surely lessons to be learned from 
judicial impeachments and though the legal standards may be the 
 
10. See Martha Neil, Federal Judge Samuel Kent Resigns, As Senate 
Impeachment Trial Looms, A.B.A. J. (June 25, 2009, 10:05 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judge_samuel_kent_re
signs_as_senate_impeachment_trial_looms [https://perma.cc/GEU9-4A 
JF]; Stewart Powell, Judge Kent’s Impeachment Came Fast and Furious, 
Houston Chron., (June 19, 2009, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron. 
com/news/houston-texas/article/Judge-Kent-s-impeachment-came-fast-and-
furious-1729616.php [https://perma.cc/RT4K-E7A2]. 
11. See Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 
291, 303–04 (1999) (arguing that presidential impeachments differ from 
those of other impeachable officers); see also Raoul Berger, 
Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 3–4 (1973) (noting that 
for the founding generation, impeachment of judges was “decidedly 
peripheral”). 
12. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance 
of the Impeachment and Trial of President Clinton, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 
349, 364–66 (1999) (discussing the role of party unity and presidential 
popularity in impeachments). 
13. For thoughtful commentary on the current state of congressional 
partisanship, see Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even 
Worse Than It Looks 3 (2012). See also Mickey Edwards, The 
Parties Versus The People 4 (2012); Ronald Brownstein, The 
Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship Has Paralyzed 
Washington and Polarized America 10 (2007); Richard H. Pildes, 
Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy 
in America, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 273, 273 (2011). For an interesting 
empirical evaluation of congressional partisanship, see Chris Cillizza, The 
Story of How Congress Has Grown More Partisan—in One Amazing 
Chart, Wash. Post (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/10/31/the-story-of-congress-has-grown-more-partisan-
in-one-amazing-chart/ [https://perma.cc/S53S-A2CY]. 
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same,14 one can think about judicial and presidential impeachments 
differently. This possibility is enhanced when you add the likelihood 
of politically divided government in the political branches. Since the 
Clinton impeachment, articles of impeachment were formally filed 
against numerous public officials—in the George W. Bush Adminis-
tration alone, articles of impeachment were filed against President 
Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.15 During the 
Obama years, articles of impeachment were filed against Attorney 
General Eric Holder and IRS Commissioner John Koskinen.16 And, 
now, at least one formal article of impeachment has been filed against 
President Trump.17 Even beyond concerns about naked partisanship 
and the reality of modern congressional politics, one cannot ignore the 
possibility that Congress as an institution may at some point feel 
legitimately compelled to protect itself and other institutions from a 
President whose public conduct poses a threat to the rule of law, con-
stitutional government, or the separation of powers. Partisan im-
peachment concerns aside, then, impeachment remains an essential 
feature of our government of limited and enumerated powers, a 
 
14. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other Institutional 
Ramifications of the Clinton Scandals, 60 Md. L. Rev. 59, 73–76 (2001) 
(evaluating with skepticism the arguments for different standards); 
Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 370–73 (same); Senator Jeff Sessions, Judicial 
Independence: Did the Clinton Impeachment Erode the Principle?, 29 
Cumb. L. Rev. 489, 490 (1999) (arguing that only a single standard for 
impeachment exists). 
15. See Elizabeth B. Bazan, Cong. Research Serv., 7-5700, 
Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions, 
Procedure, and Practice 19–20 (2010). For specific actions, see 
Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 1258, 110th Cong. (2008); Articles 
of Impeachment Against George Walker Bush, President of the United 
States of America, and Other Officials, for High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 1106, 109th Cong. (2006); Directing the 
Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Attorney General of the United States, Should Be Impeached for High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 589, 110th Cong. (2007). All of 
these were referred to a House committee, but no action was taken. 
16. Impeaching Eric H. Holder, Jr. Attorney General of the United States, for 
High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 411, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Impeaching John Andrew Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 494, 
114th Cong. (2015); Impeaching John Andrew Koskinen, Commissioner of 
the Internal Revenue Service, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. 
Res. 828, 114th Cong. (2016). 
17. Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 438, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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legitimate and meaningful legislative weapon for assuring public 
accountability to the Constitution and rule of law—its somewhat 
troubled history notwithstanding. Legal scholarship therefore should 
continue to urge understanding in this area, and not feel content to 
leave impeachment permanently in the late-1990s. 
Of course, the ultimate question is whether President Trump has 
committed or will commit impeachable offenses—“treason, bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors.”18 Again, much of the early 
Trump presidency has been consumed by scandal and controversy. 
With various scandals during the Trump presidency, talk of crimi-
nality has inevitably ensued.19 But impeachment is not concerned with 
mere criminality. Its focus is abuse of the public trust,20 though this 
may often intersect with criminality. Impeachment requires—indeed, 
is the ultimate exercise of—careful and thorough congressional over-
sight and investigation of the executive, beyond what prosecutors and 
other law enforcement officials may pursue. During the Trump presi-
dency, then, congressional investigation and oversight of the executive 
 
18. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. 
19. See, e.g., Nick Akerman, Pile of Evidence Proves Trump Committed 
Federal Crime in Attempt to Obstruct FBI Investigation, N.Y. Daily 
News (June 8, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
politics/evidence-proves-trump-committed-federal-crime-article-1.3229636 
[https://perma.cc/FFU5-QZNY]; Jason Le Miere, Did Trump Break the 
Law Over Alleged ‘Morning Joe,’ ‘National Enquirer’ Blackmail Threats?, 
Newsweek (June 30, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-
morning-joe-blackmail-enquirer-630536 [https://perma.cc/HDF5-M739]. 
Recently, media reports indicated that the President was considering 
broad use of his pardon power to insulate members of his family and staff, 
and possibly, himself, from criminal prosecution related to the Russia-
influence investigation. This, too, provoked commentary on the potential 
criminality of such an action. See Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, If Trump 
Pardons, It Could Be a Crime, N.Y. Times (July 21, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump-pardons-crime-russia.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q922-KJMJ]. 
20. See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States 571 § 798; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of 
Impeachment History, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 603, 609–10 (1999) 
(compiling prominent authorities who agree that “other high crimes and 
misdemeanors” refers to conduct that need not be an indictable crime, but 
rather is an abuse of power—a “political crime”); Ronald D. Rotunda, An 
Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky. 
L.J. 707, 725–26 (1987) (explaining why “American experience supports 
the conclusion that an impeachable offense need not be a crime.”); Frank 
O. Bowman III & Stephen L. Sepinuck, High Crimes & Misdemeanors: 
Defining the Constitutional Limits on Presidential Impeachment, 72 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1517, 1523 (1999) (noting the weight of authority 
supporting the rule that impeachable offenses need not be crimes and 
compiling sources). 
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may be more significant than it has been in at least a generation. 
Impeachment talk must therefore consist of more than simply whether 
a particular presidential act constitutes an impeachable offense. Once 
the House determines that an offense is at least impeachable, it must 
determine whether to impeach.21 And even if it does so, the Senate is 
presented with yet another complicated problem: assuming that an 
impeachable offense is submitted, what must—or should—happen 
next? 
Consider the following hypothetical example. It is the final day of 
the President’s—any President’s—impeachment trial in the United 
States Senate. The House Managers have introduced massive amounts 
of evidence over the course of two weeks. That evidence tends to show 
that the President engaged in the very conduct that was the subject 
of the articles of impeachment that the House approved. The Presi-
dent’s lawyers, in his defense, have been frustrated, unable to serious-
ly counter the House’s proof of the alleged acts. In their closing state-
ments, the President’s lawyers feel that they are left with the 
following strategy: argue to the Senators that, despite proof that the 
President engaged in conduct that amounts to an impeachable of-
fense, he should not be removed from office. The argument is a 
politically powerful one in light of several facts about the President’s 
popularity and job performance. The President’s public approval rat-
ings stand at about 55 percent, despite the impeachment. The nation-
al economy is growing, the military remains strong, and the President 
has worked with Congress to achieve meaningful reform of tax and 
international trade policy, and has even worked with the opposing 
political party to secure passage of a major infrastructure bill. By all 
objective measurements, his presidency has been successful. Must a 
voting Senator convict the President if the Senator is persuaded that 
the President committed the offense, and that it is an impeachable 
one, even if the Senator personally believes that the President ought 
to be permitted to remain in office because of his popularity and 
accomplishments? 
The answer to that normative question requires special focus on 
the nature of impeachment, which, in turn, requires some focus on the 
use of the words “convicted” and “conviction” in the various im-
peachment provisions of the Constitution. The impeachment clauses 
provide the necessary text, but their scope and meaning raise ques-
tions. Article I, section 3 of the Constitution states that, upon 
impeachment in the House and trial in the Senate, “no Person shall 
be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members 
present.”22 The next clause states that “the Party convicted” shall be 
 
21. See U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 5. 
22. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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“liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, 
according to law.”23 Article II, section 4 says that the President, Vice-
President, and all civil officers shall be “removed from office on im-
peachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.”24 The process thus far seems clear: the 
House impeaches the Party, the Senate tries and decides whether to 
convict the Party. But when deciding whether to convict, must 
removal from office form a distinct consideration?25 Should Senators 
consider the political consequences of conviction? What, then, does it 
mean to “convict” someone in this context? 
In the ordinary criminal law use of the term, of course, it means 
to find a party guilty; to impose a legally binding determination that 
he has done as a matter of fact what is alleged.26 But find them guilty 
of what, exactly? After all, the Constitution’s use of the term is not 
limited to the impeachment context. Article III, section 3 provides 
that “no person shall be convicted of treason except where there are 
two witnesses to the same overt act or upon confession in open 
court.”27 It seems clear that with respect to treason, to convict a 
person of treason means to determine that she committed all of the 
elements of treason—levying war against the United States or adher-
ing to the enemy, giving them aid and comfort—but only where the 
evidence consists of the requisite witness testimony or confession in 
 
23. Id. at cl. 7. 
24. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. 
25. There exists some disagreement among scholars as to whether removal 
from office is actually required on impeachment. Joseph Isenbergh, for 
example, argued that impeachment was not limited to “treason, bribery, 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors,” and that the Senate could 
convict an executive official for other misconduct but that removal from 
office would be permitted but not be required. See Joseph Isenbergh, 
Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 53, 63–64 (1999); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, 
Editorial, Convict, But Don’t Remove, Clinton, Wall St. J. (Jan. 29, 
1999, 12:01 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB917560066964106500 
[https://perma.cc/QEC6-S6C8] (endorsing Isenbergh’s view). Substantial 
authority concludes that impeachable offenses are limited to those 
enumerated in the Constitution—treason, bribery, or other high crimes 
and misdemeanors—and that removal is required. See, e.g., Susan Low 
Bloch, A Report Card on the Impeachment: Judging the Institutions 
That Judged President Clinton, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 143, 157 
(2000) (arguing that the linkage of conviction and removal is 
constitutionally mandated and any procedure for separating them is 
unconstitutional). 
26. Convict, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). 
27. U.S. Const. art III, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
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open court.28 In the impeachment context, though, it is less textually 
clear what the Senate is being asked to do when it is asked to vote to 
convict or acquit an impeached Party. Can a Senator legitimately 
vote to acquit an impeached party despite a belief—or even an affirm-
ative finding—that the Party is guilty of doing what the House has 
alleged in the articles of impeachment? The concern is that a Senator 
will vote to acquit the impeached Party because—regardless of the 
Party’s guilt as a factual matter—the Senator does not, as a political 
matter, wish the Party to be removed from office, which conviction 
would arguably require. This problem is especially acute with presi-
dential impeachments because of concerns about “undoing”29 the na-
tional election of the unitary head of the executive branch. Following 
the Clinton impeachment, Akhil Amar observed that a Senator could 
not convict and remove President Clinton because the Senator’s con-
stituents wanted Al Gore to be the president.30 But a different 
question arises in this context: could the Senate decline to convict 
President Clinton simply because it did not want Al Gore to be presi-
dent, even if Senators believed President Clinton actually committed 
impeachable offenses? What if today’s Senate preferred President 
Trump to Vice President Mike Pence? Or what if the Senator 
believed that his prospects for re-election, or his popularity in his 
home state, would benefit from acquitting the President, notwith-
standing a personal belief that the President in fact committed an 
impeachable offense? We have heard about the dangers of partisan or 
politically-motivated prosecutions and convictions, but should we also 
be concerned about partisan or politically-motivated acquittals? 
Consider the previous hypothetical, but now suppose that the 
President has only middling popularity nationwide, or even that he is 
deeply unpopular nationally, but won Senator X’s state overwhelm-
ingly and remains highly popular with most voters there. Moreover, 
suppose that voters in town hall meetings and through constituent 
correspondence have informed Senator X that they expect her to work 
closely with the President and to be loyal to both the President and 
their shared political party. To make matters more complicated, the 
President begins holding rallies in Senator X’s state in an effort to so-
lidify his voter base and presumably increase pressure on Senator X to 
defend him during the trial. Does—should—any of this alter the 
Senator’s calculation on impeachment, if the Senator is nonetheless 
persuaded that the President committed an impeachable offense? 
 
28. See id. 
29. Amar, supra note 11, at 311. 
30. Id. at 307. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Conviction, Nullification, and the Limits of Impeachment as Politics 
285 
Assume that the Senator is moved by the political calculations 
and votes not to convict. This practice may have an analogue in the 
ordinary criminal law, albeit an imperfect one—jury nullification. Jury 
nullification is the practice of jurors in a criminal trial refusing to con-
vict a criminal defendant despite proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the defendant’s guilt.31 Jury nullification has both a distinguished and 
controversial history in the criminal law.32 As a matter of raw power, 
jurors nullify, and this prevents re-prosecution pursuant to principles 
of double jeopardy.33 Defenders argue that such a power is “a vital 
component of democracy and its lawmaking function,”34 giving 
citizens an important voice in the enforcement of a morally just 
criminal law and serving as a safeguard against government oppres-
sion.35 Scholars have also demonstrated that common law juries, as 
would have been known to the Framers, had the power to judge the 
scope of the law in addition to the facts and therefore could acquit a 
criminal defendant based on the jury’s own interpretation of the 
applicable law.36 
Critics, though, claim that jury nullification breeds disrespect and 
disregard for the law and for a court’s instructions, undermines the 
role of the judiciary in the constitutional system, and that moral con-
cerns about a particular criminal law or its enforcement should be 
addressed through other public institutions, such as the legislative 
branch.37 Critics further note that even if jurors can nullify as an exer-
cise of raw power, there is no such right to do so and courts should 
not be complicit in encouraging it.38 So despite its pedigree and the 
 
31. See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 5–6 (4th ed. 
2006). 
32. Id. at 6–7; see also Kaimipono David Wenger & David Hoffman, 
Nullificatory Juries, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1115, 1129 (2003) (describing the 
history of criminal jury nullification and stating that it was “extremely 
popular in the colonies”). 
33. Dressler, supra note 31, at 5–7. 
34. Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 579, 586 (2014). 
35. See, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury’s Second Coming, 100 Geo. L.J. 
657, 687 (2012); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of 
Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1149, 1152 (1997); Paul Butler, Racially Based 
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale 
L.J. 677, 713 (1995). 
36. See Carroll, supra note 34, at 588. 
37. See United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111–22 (D. Mass. 2008); 
State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 1369 (N.J. 1986). 
38. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997); Crease v. 
McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999); Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 
120. 
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claims of its defenders, modern criminal law and jurisprudence—and 
some modern legal scholarship—often view jury nullification with sig-
nificant skepticism and derision.39 Consequently, if Senators sitting as 
a court of impeachment are engaged in a process analogous to that of 
criminal jurors or even judges, then it is fair to question whether a 
practice of Senatorial nullification is any more legitimate. 
The major object of this Article, then, is to urge greater attention 
to the institutional role of, and impeachment decision-making in, the 
Senate. Accordingly, this Article focuses on the use of the words “con-
victed” and “conviction” in the impeachment clauses, highlighting the 
overlap between impeachments and the criminal law. This Article 
then places Senate decisions whether to convict into three categories: 
the Anti-Nullification Approach, which bases the decision to convict 
solely on a finding of factual guilt and accepts the House’s consti-
tutional judgment as conclusive; the Independent Interpretation 
Approach, which permits the Senator to consider both the factual 
basis for guilt as well as to independently determine whether the 
conduct constitutes “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and mis-
demeanors;” and the Political Nullification Approach, where the 
Senator possesses a factual belief in guilt for what she deems to be 
legitimately impeachable conduct, but declines conviction based solely 
upon the political inexpediency of removal upon conviction. This 
Article acknowledges that impeachment is “political,” rather than 
strictly legal, but concludes that its political nature is often over-
stated. Rather, the Senate undergoes a transformation as a court of 
impeachment. This transformation—which reflects the overlap of im-
peachment with traditional criminal law, protects the institutional 
prerogatives of the Senate, and promotes presidential responsibility—
demands that a Senator, when deciding whether to convict, eschew 
the kind of partisan or electoral considerations that form a part of the 
Senate’s ordinary legislative business. 
I. “Conviction,” Criminal Law Terminology, and the 
Nullification Analogue 
The ample scholarship on impeachment has not devoted consider-
able attention to the use of the terms “convicted” and “conviction” in 
the impeachment clauses. Perhaps the use of these words is not 
 
39. See Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614; Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 120; United States 
v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972); State v. Hatori, 990 
P.2d 115, 122 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999); Holden v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1253, 
1255 (Ind. 2003); Ragland, 519 A.2d at 1369; Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., 
Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1, 2 
(1997); Steven M. Warshawsky, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, 
and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 Geo. L.J. 191, 192 (1996). 
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terribly significant. However, the use of these terms may tell us some-
thing more about the character of Senate impeachment proceedings. 
Placing this “conviction” terminology in context, this Part explores 
the textual and structural significance of understanding the Senate as 
a quasi-judicial—rather than strictly political—body when sitting as a 
court of impeachment, and what this could mean for the institutional 
role of the Senate when it decides upon conviction in impeachment 
trials. 
A. Impeachment Trials as (Quasi) Criminal Justice 
Impeachment, it is often noted, is not a strictly criminal 
proceeding.40 This is in contrast to English impeachments, which were 
more closely tied to criminality, as impeachment carried the possibil-
ity of death, prison, or significant fine.41 It is, as Joseph Story ob-
served, a political one designed to protect the institutions of gov-
ernment by divesting the impeached party of his office, but not 
imposing punishment.42 Alexander Hamilton, too, devoted consider-
able attention to the nature of impeachment in Federalist 65. There, 
discussing the Senate’s role, Hamilton explained that impeachment’s 
jurisdiction concerns “the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words, the abuse or violation of some public trust.”43 Hamilton further 
stated that impeachments are “with peculiar propriety . . . political, 
as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.”44 The constitutional text plainly leaves criminal prosecution 
and punishment as a distinct option once conviction and removal on 
impeachment are finalized.45 And as Raoul Berger has noted, reading 
impeachment as a criminal proceeding would potentially implicate a 
number of constitutional limits unique to the criminally accused, such 
 
40. See Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of 
Representatives in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 735, 789 (1999) (describing the Senate’s role as 
“political”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to 
Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 90 (1989); 
Bowman & Sepunick, supra note 20, at 1563 (describing impeachment as 
a political process). 
41. Berger, supra note 11, at 78. 
42. See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States 573 § 803 (1987). 
43. See The Federalist No. 65, at 394, 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed., 1962). 
44. Id. at 394–95.  
45. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. 
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as the double jeopardy bar and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury.46 
And yet, while not formally “criminal” in the legal or constitu-
tional sense, the overlap of impeachment with the criminal law 
remains striking. The text on impeachable offenses uses the language 
of criminality—“treason,” “bribery,” “high crimes and misdemean-
ors”47—even though there is compelling scholarly evidence to support 
the proposition that the underlying act need not be a common law or 
statutory crime to be impeachable.48 The President’s pardon power 
applies to “offenses” against the United States, “except in cases of 
impeachment.”49 Article III explains that the trial of all “crimes, 
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury.”50 This provision, of 
course, is subject to any change that the Sixth Amendment’s jury 
trial guarantee works,51 but it nonetheless tells us something impor-
tant about the thinking of the Framers with respect to the subjects of 
impeachment. In addition, the Impeachment Clauses speak in terms of 
a “conviction,” a term otherwise unique to a criminal setting.52 So 
even if these provisions do not make the impeachment trial an ordi-
nary criminal trial with all of its trappings and procedural safeguards, 
they indicate that impeachment draws its core from the criminal law. 
Hamilton’s description in Federalist 65 should not be taken to 
mean that impeachments have a conventional political nature, un-
moored from traditional criminal process. Recall that Hamilton says 
impeachments may be denominated “with peculiar propriety” as 
political, in the sense that they involve offenses against society.53 He 
does not appear to use “political” to mean concern with raw politics 
or electoral consequences; rather, his use of that term occurs in the 
 
46. See Berger, supra note 11, at 78–85. 
47. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. 
48. See generally Charles L. Black Jr., Impeachment: A Handbook 33–
34 (Yale Univ. 1974). 
49. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
50. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
51. See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1904) (stating that in 
any conflict between Article III, section 2 and the Sixth Amendment, the 
Sixth Amendment must prevail). 
52. U.S. Const. art I, § 3. This is different, incidentally, than the problem 
identified by other scholars related to the standard of proof. See, e.g., 
Black, supra note 48, at 16–17. Even if we identify the relevant standard 
of proof for a conviction—say, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or clear 
and convincing evidence—that still does not tell us to what question the 
Senate must apply the relevant standard. 
53. The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 394. 
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context of misconduct or abuse of office that constitutes an offense 
against the state—political crimes; for example, treason and bribery.54 
He also uses the term “conviction” as well as the term “prosecution” 
to describe the process for trying impeachments.55 
In light of these realities in the text and its intellectual history, 
perhaps, as Charles Black has explained, the question is not whether 
impeachment ought to be characterized as “criminal” or something 
else, but whether there are certain aspects of impeachment that ought 
to be treated the same as we treat them in criminal adjudication.56 
This is not to say that impeachment commands no significance in 
political, rather than legal, terms. As Jeffrey Tulis has thoughtfully 
explained, the danger of over-legalizing impeachment is that such a 
view ignores—or at least undervalues—the political understanding of 
impeachment.57 According to Tulis, even though the Constitution 
“does offer a kind of template for an analogy between the processes 
for impeachment and conviction and those of indictment and trial,”58 
it also separates impeachment from other legal processes.59 And de-
spite creating a pretense of legality, the Constitution does this so as 
to “structure an extraordinary political process—a process more ele-
vated and less partisan than ordinary politics.”60 For Tulis, then, 
impeachment should be understood as a particular kind of political 
process, rather than a brazenly partisan one at one extreme or a 
strictly legal one at the other. About this, Tulis is persuasive. But 
even if it is desirable to avoid a hyper-legalization of impeachment, 
one should not diminish the significance of impeachment’s legal as-
pects, particularly as they relate to the formalities of the criminal jus-
tice process. It is a hybrid of the political and the legal, a political 
process moderated by legal formalities that give impeachment legiti-
 
54. See Gerhardt, supra note 20, at 612 (explaining Hamilton’s use of the 
term in connection with other historical sources that also referred to 
impeachment as involving political crimes); see also Jonathan Turley, 
Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian 
Device, 49 Duke L.J. 1, 5 n.7 (1999) (explaining that the Senate’s use of 
the word political is due to a misconstruction of Hamilton’s view). 
55. See The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 397. 
56. Black, supra note 48, at 15.  
57. Jeffrey K. Tulis, Impeachment in the Constitutional Order, in The 
Constitutional Presidency 229, 235–37 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey 
K. Tulis, eds., 2009). 
58. Id. at 236. 
59. Id. at 236–37. 
60. Id. at 237. 
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macy, sobriety, even gravitas. As Akhil Amar has observed, im-
peachment is “sensibly political as well as legal.”61 
Regardless of how we characterize impeachment more broadly—as 
criminal trial-like, or otherwise—the text’s multiple uses of the term 
“conviction” strengthen the relationship of impeachment and criminal 
law. This is especially true when we consider that it is the one term 
used with respect to Senate impeachment trials that is exclusively 
understood in the criminal context in other provisions of the Consti-
tution: In Article III, when referring to a person being “convicted” of 
treason,62 and in the Thirteenth Amendment, when referring to a 
person “duly convicted” for a crime who may be punished by slavery 
or involuntary servitude.63 For purposes of understanding what it is 
that Senators do when they deliberate on articles of impeachment—
that is, when they decide whether to “convict”—it is sensible to draw 
our understanding from criminal adjudication. Understanding the pro-
cess of conviction and acquittal in the criminal arena demands some 
reflection on nullification. 
B. Nullification in the Criminal Law 
It has been said that nullification is appropriate because the jury 
represents the “conscience of the community” in a criminal case.64 The 
jury is representative of the community’s interest in justice, fairness, 
and equality—values that nullification allows the community to 
express through the mechanism of the jury.65 This is true, advocates 
argue, even when the formalities of the criminal law would demand a 
different result.66 Yet the arguments for nullification tend to arise 
most forcefully in circumstances where the jury legitimately occupies 
 
61. See Amar, supra note 11, at 294; see also Keith Whittington, What Is the 
Downside of Not Impeaching?, LawFare Blog (July 25, 2017, 12:00 
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-downside-not-impeaching [https: 
//perma.cc/DU54-4UU6] (discussing the kinds of politics at work in 
impeachments). 
62. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3. Of course, a person may also be “convicted” 
of treason in impeachment, rather than criminal proceedings, but Article 
III appears to be describing treason in the context of criminal trial and 
punishment in a federal court. 
63. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2. 
64. See generally Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 
Mich. L. Rev. 2381, 2420 (1999) (stating that “the jury is frequently 
referred to as the ‘conscience of the community,’ or variations on that 
theme.”). 
65. See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 579, 622–26 
(2014) (describing nullification as a reminder that laws obtain their values 
from the people). 
66. See id. at 57. 
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some reasonable and high moral ground, such as preventing govern-
ment oppression or misconduct, exposing the injustice of a particular 
law or its application against a particular defendant,67 or where a jury 
engages in a form of legal interpretation that leads it to conclude that 
the law does not apply in the particular case.68 
Still, even those claims can find expression in other ways consist-
ent with the forms of a constitutional democracy, such as by lobbying 
for legislative change in the law, by forming strong public opposition 
to a particular prosecution, or by taking one’s case to the ballot box.69 
In addition, creating an atmosphere of permissiveness or even of af-
firmative endorsement with respect to nullification also creates the 
possibility that jurors will nullify based on less worthy grounds, or 
that such decisions will be based on arbitrary factors such as race, or 
gender, or religion, or even on raw political grounds.70 
Even the Supreme Court has referenced jury nullification disap-
provingly. In Sparf v. United States,71 the Court held that defendants 
lacked a right to a jury instruction on nullification power.72 In 
Woodson v. North Carolina,73 the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment requires individualized consideration of a capital defend-
ant’s crime and background, and thus forbids the government from 
imposing a mandatory death penalty upon conviction of capital mur-
der.74 One of the Court’s arguments against mandatory death penal-
ties was the possibility that jurors who wanted to convict but did not 
want the death penalty imposed might simply nullify, preferring ac-
 
67. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 35, at 1172–96 (discussing the relevance of 
jury nullification in correcting government officials’ rule violations); 
Adrien Leavitt, Queering Jury Nullification: Using Jury Nullification As a 
Tool to Fight Against the Criminalization of Queer and Transgender 
People, Seattle U. J. for Soc. Just. 709 (2012) (explaining why it is 
morally justifiable for queer and trans jurors to use jury nullification to 
subvert the criminal legal system); Butler, supra note 35, at 709–14 
(encouraging African American jurors to take advantage of jury 
nullification if, in their estimation, the operation of criminal law in the 
United States does not advance the interests of black people). 
68. See Brown, supra note 35, at 1183. 
69. Cf. Warshawsky, supra note 39, at 216 (arguing that jury nullification 
“proposes the unprincipled extension of interest group politics beyond the 
state house and into the jury room”). 
70. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997). 
71. 156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
72. Id. at 74. 
73. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
74. Id. at 303–05. 
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quittal of a guilty defendant to the imposition of capital punishment.75 
The context in which the Court made this argument was one that 
strongly suggested disapproval of the practice.76 Finally, in Strickland 
v. Washington,77 the Court held that defendants claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must prove both deficient performance by 
counsel and prejudice to the defendant, describing nullification as an 
example of “lawlessness” in determining how to apply the prejudice 
prong of its holding.78 Consequently, even though jury nullification 
may have an attractive pedigree and appeal in some academic 
circles—and even exist with grudging acceptance—many influential 
courts have not viewed it as broadly praiseworthy or desirable.79 
Moreover, if the Senate is more like a court rather than a jury, 
and impeachment trials are akin to a bench trial rather than a jury 
trial, then the analogy to nullification is really to judicial nullification 
rather than jury nullification. Recall that during the Clinton 
impeachment trial, the Senate not only voted on the articles of im-
peachment but also voted on motions—as a judge, but not a jury, 
would do. This included rejecting a motion to dismiss by a simple ma-
jority vote.80 And whatever pedigree jury nullification enjoys, a similar 
one does not appear to exist for judicial nullification. Joshua Dressler 
notes that the literature on judicial nullification is scant.81 The exist-
ing literature does not place judicial nullification on par with jury 
nullification in terms of historical tradition or political value, though 
it concedes that judicial nullification likely happens, perhaps with 
 
75. Id. at 293, 303. 
76. For example, when describing the history of jury attitudes toward 
mandatory death penalties, the Court stated that jurors have “with some 
regularity, disregarded their oaths” in refusing to convict defendants of 
crimes that carried a mandatory death sentence. Id. at 293. The Court 
also said that mandatory death penalties could exacerbate the problem of 
arbitrary and capricious determinations of who lives and who dies “by 
resting the penalty determination on the particular jury’s willingness to 
act lawlessly.” Id. at 303. 
77. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
78. Id. at 695. 
79. See, e.g., Sparf v. United States. 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895); Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 695; United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Kryzske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988) (approving 
of the trial court’s refusal to instruct on nullification and statement that 
there is no such thing as “valid jury nullification”). 
80. See 145 Cong. Rec. S1,017–18 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999). This procedure 
was approved in the resolution that established the procedures for the 
trial. See S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999). 
81. See Dressler, supra note 31, at 6 n.37. 
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some frequency.82 Indeed, the treatment that jury nullification has re-
ceived in modern criminal law from many judges indicates why judi-
cial nullification would be both rare and difficult to defend. As one 
commentator wrote, “judges are repeat players in the justice system, 
making judicial nullification more dangerous for the judicial system in 
the long run.”83 The argument continues: “[a] judge’s routine refusal 
to follow the law is more pernicious than a single verdict rendered by 
twelve jurors, randomly selected from the community, who are then 
released from service, unlikely to serve again in the near future.”84 Of 
course, the rarity of impeachment raises the question of whether Sena-
tors really are repeat-players in the same way that judges are. 
C. Nullification in Impeachments 
The notion of nullification in the impeachment conviction context 
was advanced most directly by Jonathan Turley in his substantial 
scholarship on the Clinton impeachment.85 But Turley’s nullification 
idea was chiefly directed at the House acting in its capacity as both 
quasi-grand juror and quasi-prosecutor.86 There is some reason to 
 
82. See id. (stating that judicial nullification “doubtlessly occurs on 
occasion”); see also Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 Ind. L.J. 
1281, 1281 (1993) (defending judicial nullification); Paula L. Hannaford-
Agor, Judicial Nullification? Judicial Compliance and Non-Compliance 
with Jury Improvement Efforts, 28 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 407, 421–24 (2008) 
(questioning the legitimacy of judicial nullification); M.B.E. Smith, May 
Judges Ever Nullify the Law?, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1657, 1671 
(1999) (observing that “judicial nullification does happen fairly often, and 
sometimes, upon reflection, it seems clearly to have been the right 
decision”). 
83. Hannaford-Agor, supra note 82, at 423. 
84. Id. 
85. See Turley, supra note 40, at 788. It is notable that the issue arose, albeit 
in a different context, during the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 
1805. See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic 
Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew 
Johnson 60–70 (1992). One of the grounds for Chase’s impeachment was 
that he refused to allow lawyers during the trial of John Fries to make 
arguments about the law of treason to the jury that tried Fries. Id. at 63. 
It is difficult, though, to read much into this historical footnote. On the 
one hand, this suggests—indeed, it arguably confirms—that the founding 
generation would have understood jury nullification in the form of 
independent legal interpretation to be an acceptable and even desirable 
practice. And yet, Chase was acquitted. We do not know the reasons the 
Senators had for their votes. Id. at 108. But Chase’s acquittal on this 
ground could suggest that his refusal to allow this kind of nullification 
argument was either not improper or not a sufficiently serious breach of 
the judicial role as to warrant conviction on impeachment. 
86. Turley, supra note 40, at 787. 
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question whether the nullification analogy works well in that context, 
or whether the House’s refusal to bring articles of impeachment is 
simply more akin to an exercise of ordinary prosecutorial discretion.87 
Turley briefly discussed the concept of nullification in the Senate and 
conceded that if such nullification is to occur, then the Senate is 
where it should occur.88 In fact, Turley argued that the Framers 
“anticipated” a kind of jury nullification in the Senate because they 
wanted the Senate to consider a variety of factors relevant to the 
national interest in deciding whether to convict.89 Similarly—though 
he did not use the terminology of nullification—Akhil Amar also 
alluded to what functions as the nullification power of the Senate. 
“Like trial jurors, Senators have the inherent power to acquit against 
the evidence—to decide, as the conscience of the community, that 
even if the charges are true, they do not warrant a conviction.”90 
Again likening the Senators to an “ordinary criminal juror,” Amar 
argued that “each Senator is free to be merciful for a wide variety of 
reasons—because she thinks the defendant has suffered enough, or 
because the punishment does not fit the crime, or because punishing 
the defendant would impose unacceptable costs on third parties.”91 
Still, the nullification analogue is not perfect. One manifestation 
of jury nullification occurs when jurors interpret the law differently 
than it is given to them in the judge’s instructions; there is an ob-
jective law that the jurors are instructed to, but do not wish to, 
apply.92 This analogue makes sense in the impeachment context only 
if we treat the House’s view of impeachability as carrying dispositive 
weight. Otherwise, one might argue, Senators who disagree with the 
impeachability of an official’s conduct are not really nullifying any-
thing; they are exercising discretionary judgment about the meaning 
of the law, which, arguably, the Constitution independently affords 
 
87. Susan Low Bloch’s testimony before the House Judiciary Committee’s 
Constitution Subcommittee in 1998 also alluded to the concept of refusing 
to impeach, even if the House had evidence that an impeachable offense 
had been committed. See Background and History of Impeachment: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 232 (1998) (statement of Susan Low Bloch). 
Again, though, Bloch appears to be discussing what amounts to the 
exercise of discretion, rather than jury nullification. 
88. Turley, supra note 40, at 788. 
89. Id. at 788 n.277. 
90. Amar, supra note 11, at 311. 
91. Id. at 307. 
92. See Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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them.93 And yet, if a Senator agrees with the House, accepts the im-
peachability of the conduct, and believes that the official has com-
mitted the conduct alleged, then the decision not to convict more 
closely approaches a form of nullification—such as where a juror re-
fuses to convict because she does not approve of the punishment that 
the defendant would face upon conviction. The analogy seems even 
more appropriate where the Senator refuses to convict on grounds 
that have nothing to do with the facts or the law. 
Moreover, the comparison with ordinary jury nullification is argu-
ably limited by the structural attributes of the Senate. After all, once 
you concede that impeachment trial is emphatically not a criminal 
trial and that impeachment is political as well as legal, then a ration-
ale exists for defending Senatorial nullification that perhaps does not 
exist for defending criminal jury nullification. Consider, for example, 
the incident during the Clinton impeachment in which one of the 
House Managers, Representative Bob Barr of Georgia, referred to the 
Senators as “jurors.”94 Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa raised an imme-
diate objection, arguing that the Senators were not “jurors,” but 
rather, Senators, meaning that they had a role that ordinary criminal 
jurors do not.95 Chief Justice Rehnquist sustained the objection, 
admonishing the House Managers that the Senate was sitting as a 
“court” and the Senators were not mere jurors.96 To some extent, the 
Harkin objection was a sensible one and highlights what is the 
conventional wisdom on the Senate’s role: impeachment is ultimately 
different than a criminal trial and Senators must exercise judgments 
that we do not expect an ordinary lay jury in a criminal case to 
exercise. But does that include judgments that amount to a kind of 
Senatorial nullification?97 
Finally, why does it matter? After all, impeachments are largely 
immune from judicial review,98 and there always remains the some-
what cynical view that a Senator, believing his or her decision to be 
 
93. See U.S. Const. art I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole power to 
try all impeachments.”). 
94. 145 Cong. Rec. S279 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999) (statement of Rep. Barr as 
House Manager). 
95. Id. (statement of Sen. Harkin). 
96. Id. (statement of Rehnquist, C.J., presiding). 
97. See generally Turley, supra note 40 at 788. This was also the view of 
many other Senators during the Clinton impeachment. See infra Part 
III.A. 
98. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 244 (1993) (“[T]he Framers’ 
conferred upon Congress a potential tool of legislative dominance yet at 
the same time rendered Congress’ exercise of that power one of the very 
few areas of legislative authority immune from any judicial review.”). 
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essentially unreviewable, will simply do as she pleases based on her 
personal political calculations. There is arguably no downside to 
engaging in ad hoc judgments, even nakedly political ones. A Senator 
who does not want an official, such as the President, removed will 
simply vote to acquit regardless of the evidence and the objective 
merit of the House’s allegations. Perhaps. But a few reasons exist to 
pursue this matter further. 
First, at a somewhat more abstract level of formal constitution-
alism, the constitutional processes of impeachment are legitimate—
and worthy of respect—only if Senators abide by an understanding of 
those processes that conforms to constitutional text, structure, and 
history, beyond their partisan predilections. Impeachment is a serious 
and sobering constitutional moment for the Senate and the Nation. 
The constitutional legitimacy of impeachment and the institutional 
legitimacy of the Senate are subject to doubt if a Senator is engaged 
in merely ad hoc decision-making or a judgment based solely on parti-
san or electoral calculations without regard to the underlying facts 
and applicable constitutional law. As explained later in this Article, 
there are reasons to think that the text and structure of the Consti-
tution contemplate that the Senator’s discretion will be guided by, 
and his or her thought processes channeled through, institutional for-
malities not unlike those that guide the decision-making of a fact-
finder or judge in a criminal trial.99 Moreover, at a less abstract level, 
if the analogy to nullification is correct, then the issue is an important 
one because nullification is an extremely controversial—and for many, 
even deeply troubling100—phenomenon. If there are reasons to object 
to jury nullification at the conviction stage of an ordinary criminal 
case, then there are reasons to at least hesitate about applying similar 
types of nullification at the conviction stage of an impeachment trial, 
even if we concede the differences between criminal trials and im-
peachments. 
II. Senate Practice and the Competing Approaches to 
“Convicting” on Impeachment 
The Senate’s role as a court of impeachment is unique in the 
constitutional scheme. Consistent with the notion that impeachment 
is not strictly criminal or even strictly legal, and without clarity as to 
how one precedent binds future voting, it is important to evaluate his-
torical practices in Senate impeachments with respect to the approach 
of various Senators in deciding whether to convict. In so doing, one 
 
99. See Turley, supra note 54, at 125–27. 
100. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (citing judicial and scholarly 
sources opposing nullification). 
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can find which patterns emerge and ask whether they are consistent 
with our constitutional architecture. 
A. Views from Presidential Impeachment Trials 
The disconnect among Senators as to what it means to “convict” 
an impeached party is apparent in the history of impeachments. The 
Clinton impeachment provides the most obvious, and compelling, ex-
amples. Recall that President Clinton was tried on two distinct 
articles of impeachment in the Senate. The first article of impeach-
ment alleged that President Clinton gave “perjurious, false, and mis-
leading testimony” to a grand jury arising out of his relationship with 
former Arkansas employee Paula Jones.101 The second article of im-
peachment alleged that President Clinton obstructed justice by con-
cealing information that related to Jones’ sexual harassment lawsuit 
against him.102 Of course, he was acquitted on each of these articles: 
forty-five Senators voted to convict on the first article, and fifty voted 
to convict on the second article.103 This Article surveys a few examples 
of the Senators’ approaches. 
In an opinion piece for the Washington Post arguing against the 
adoption of “findings of fact” in place of a single vote on conviction 
and removal, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia stated his view 
that “senators must answer not one but two questions: is the presi-
dent guilty or not guilty of committing high crimes and misdemean-
ors, and if he is guilty, do his actions warrant removal from office?”104 
Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota later endorsed Senator Byrd’s 
view.105 Arriving at much the same conclusion but through a different 
formulation, Senator Slade Gorton of Washington saw the Senate’s 
job as answering four questions: Did the House prove the facts alleged 
in the articles?; Do those facts establish the elements of the alleged 
crimes?; Are the alleged offenses high crimes or misdemeanors?; And 
 
101. Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton: 
Constitutional Provisions; Rules of Procedure and Practice in 
the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials; Articles of 
Impeachment Against President William Jefferson Clinton; 
President’s Answer; and Replication of the House of 
Representatives, S. Doc. No. 106-2, at 15–16 (1st Sess. 1999). 
102. Id. 
103. For a complete breakdown of the roll call, see How the Senators Voted on 
Impeachment, CNN (Feb. 12, 1999, 12:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/02/12/senate.vote/ [https://perma.cc/WBZ 
9-QKFJ]. 
104. Robert C. Byrd, Don’t Tinker With Impeachment, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 
1999, at A17. 
105. 145 Cong. Rec. S1,118 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Dorgan). 
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finally, even if the facts establish that the president committed a high 
crime or misdemeanor, is the offense of sufficient gravity to warrant 
conviction and removal?106 Under Senator Gorton’s formula, even if 
the Senate answers the first three questions in the affirmative, it has 
not yet “convicted” the president. Rather, “conviction” only occurs 
once it is determined that the offense was severe enough to justify 
removal. 
Senator Susan Collins of Maine stated her view of the problem: 
“the Framers wanted the Senate to make not only a determination of 
guilt, but also a judgment about what is best for our nation and its 
institutions.”107 Applying this standard, Collins voted not guilty on 
article one because she found the evidence insufficient, but not guilty 
on article two because she believed that obstruction of justice did not 
amount to a high crime or misdemeanor under the circumstances.108 
Notably, Collins said if she were a juror in a criminal case, she might 
“very well vote to convict faced with these facts.”109 She decided 
against conviction on impeachment because for impeachment the 
Senate was required to conclude from the evidence “with no room for 
doubt” that injury would be done to the Constitution and to the 
Republic if the President remained in office.110 Senator Collins also 
suggested a bifurcation, in which conviction and removal would be 
subjected to distinct votes, leading Professor Susan Low Bloch to sug-
gest that Senator Collins had been influenced by Joseph Isenbergh’s 
article that made this argument.111 Bloch and other prominent legal 
scholars objected to this suggestion in light of the Constitution’s 
command that the Senate “shall” remove the President upon “convic-
tion,” and the Senate did not permit it.112 Bloch articulated the ulti-
mate “multifaceted” question this way: “[d]id the alleged behavior 
occur and does it constitute a ‘high crime and misdemeanor’ warrant-
ing removal?”113 
Consider also Maine Senator Olympia Snowe’s nuanced inter-
pretation of the questions that the Senate must ask and answer. As 
 
106. 145 Cong. Rec. S1,462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Gorton). 
107. Id. at S1,568 (statement of Sen. Collins). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. See Bloch, supra note 25, at 157 (2000). For Isenbergh’s argument, see 
Isenberg, supra note 25, at 90. 
112. Bloch, supra note 25, at 157–58 (citing opposition by Laurence Tribe and 
Robert Bork). 
113. Id. at 159. 
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Senator Snowe articulated it, the Senate must decide “whether there 
is evidence that persuades us, in my view beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the President’s offenses constitute high crimes and misdemeanors 
that require his removal.”114 She ultimately voted against conviction 
on both of the articles of impeachment, although she concluded be-
yond a reasonable doubt that President Clinton had committed the 
underlying conduct alleged in one of the articles—presumably article 
II on obstruction of justice.115 She did not separately decide whether a 
high crime or misdemeanor had been committed, and if so, whether it 
warranted removal. Rather, her view appeared to accept the reality 
that if the offense is a high crime or misdemeanor, then the President 
must be convicted and removed once factual guilt is determined.116 
She determined, however, that his conduct did not constitute a high 
crime or misdemeanor.117 She asked whether “the President’s miscon-
duct, even if deplorable, represent[s] such an egregious and immediate 
threat to the very structure of our Government that the Constitution 
requires his removal.”118 She answered that question in the negative.119 
Similarly, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont stated his view that, 
although he was persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that 
President Clinton gave false testimony during his deposition, “the 
President lied to avoid embarrassment. However, the Framers did not 
envision such behavior as being encompassed within the phrase ‘other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.’”120 
Contrast these approaches with those of the Senate during the 
impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson, who was acquitted 
on multiple articles of impeachment, almost all of which arose out of 
President Johnson’s alleged violations of the Tenure of Office Act.121 
Johnson fired Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and replaced him with 
an interim secretary, Lorenzo Thomas, without the advice and con-
sent of the Senate which was required by the Act.122 Some senators, 
 
114. 145 Cong. Rec. S1,669 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Snowe). 
115. See id. at S1,671. 
116. See id. at S1,670 (“If I conclude that this President’s conduct is of that 
nature, I would vote to remove him.”). 
117. See id. at S1,671. 
118. Id. at S1,670. 
119. See id. at S1,671. 
120. Id. at S1,597 (statement of Sen. Jeffords). 
121. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 143–248; Michael Les 
Benedict, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson (1973). 
122. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 212–16. 
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like Lyman Trumbull of Illinois and James Grimes of Iowa, were poli-
tical adversaries of Johnson but concluded simply that the House had 
failed to prove any impeachable conduct by the President.123 In con-
trast, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts voted to convict on 
all articles, explaining his view that an “impeachment” is “political,” 
and “belongs to the Senate, which is a political body,” whereas a pro-
ceeding “according to law” is “judicial, and belongs to the courts, 
which are judicial bodies.”124 
Interestingly, and contrary to the view that impeachment trials 
are essentially political in nature, both Trumbull and Grimes viewed 
the impeachment trial as essentially judicial in its character.125 So, 
too, did others. Republican Senator George Edmunds of Vermont, 
known for his rigorous legal thinking and who ultimately voted to 
convict Johnson, also explained his view that his duties were “clearly 
judicial,” and that he would not concern himself with any of the 
political consequences of his decision whether to convict.126 He further 
explained that it was the members of the House, acting as a kind of 
grand jury, that were to be the “sole judges” of whether a violation of 
law amounted to a prosecutable—meaning, in this context, impeach-
able—offense.127 The House having done so, Edmunds explained, “we 
have only to apply the law as it is to the facts proved. We have no 
discretion to say guilty or not guilty according to our views of expedi-
ency or our personal wishes.”128 Senator William Fessenden of Maine 
made a similar point with respect to the judicial nature of the im-
peachment trial, but unlike Edmunds, ultimately found that the 
House had failed to prove any impeachable conduct. Rather, like 
Grimes, Fessenden concluded that Johnson’s removal of Stanton 
based on his construction of the Tenure of Office Act was at least 
debatable and thus should not subject him to conviction.129 Senator 
Reverdy Johnson of Maryland—also known as a leading constitutional 
lawyer of his time—in explaining his vote to acquit Johnson on all of 
the articles because the House had failed to prove them, described the 
 
123. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., Supp. 419–24 (1868) (statements 
of Sens. Trumbull and Grimes). For his part, Senator Trumbull also 
stated that one of the articles—the tenth—did not “afford just grounds 
for impeachment.” Id. at 420. 
124. Id. at 463 (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
125. See id. at 420 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (expressing that the decision 
to impeach should not be partisan); id. at 424 (statement of Sen. Grimes). 
126. Id. at 424 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. See id. at 452–57 (statement of Sen. Fessenden). 
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Senate as a “court” and stated explicitly that the Senate “is now act-
ing in a judicial character. The judgment which it may pronounce as 
regards the respondent will be final.”130 Johnson, a Democrat, also 
vowed to dismiss partisan considerations, as well as the contention 
that an acquittal would result in “civil commotion and bloodshed.”131 
Many of the statements from the Johnson impeachment create the 
image of a Senate impeachment trial as distinctly judicial, and still 
more urged that it be removed from partisan or other political consid-
erations.132 Yet—and recall the question posed earlier, as to whether 
acquittal of President Clinton would have been appropriate, even if he 
were guilty, simply because the Senate did not want Al Gore to be 
President—it is also significant to note the consequences had the 
Senate convicted Johnson. Pursuant to then-existing rules of presi-
dential succession, and because there was no vice-president, Johnson’s 
conviction and removal would have meant the elevation of Senate 
president pro tempore Benjamin Wade of Ohio to the presidency.133 
This would have been an unpopular result across the political spec-
trum,134 and even Senator Edmunds later speculated that several of 
his colleagues would likely have voted to convict Johnson had Wade 
not been the next in line to succeed Johnson.135 So even if the re-
spective statements by those who voted to acquit President Johnson 
do not reveal the kind of overt nullification theories addressed here, 
there remains evidence that a kind of nullification may have been at 
work in the Johnson acquittal, and perhaps in the Clinton acquittal, 
as well. 
 
130. Id. at 431 (statement of Sen. Johnson). 
131. Id. 
132. See, e.g., id. at 420 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (detailing political 
disagreements with Johnson but voting nonetheless to acquit). 
133. See Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886). See 
also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential 
Succession Law Unconstitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 123 (1995) 
(discussing Wade’s role in the Johnson impeachment). 
134. See Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 246–47 (stating that both Republicans 
and Democrats were uncomfortable allowing Wade to become President 
because he supported progressive causes). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
account of the trial also states that there were “rumors” regarding efforts 
by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, who presided, to secure votes against 
Johnson’s conviction, presumably because Wade had failed to support 
Chase’s run for the presidency in 1860. Id. at 247. It was never proven 
that Chase tried to secure these votes, but, as Rehnquist states, “Chase’s 
overweening ambition for the presidency lent credibility to” the rumors. 
Id. 
135. See Benedict, supra note 121, at 141. 
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B. Categorizing the Approaches to “Convicting” on Impeachment 
Based on this admittedly incomplete history of senatorial prac-
tices in voting on presidential impeachments, there is a hodgepodge of 
approaches as to whether the Senator should “convict.” What is rel-
evant is not just the question that each Senator must ask herself when 
voting on the articles of impeachment. Rather, it is whether a purely 
political consideration—one that does not relate to the purely factual 
question of whether the President did what is alleged nor to the legal 
definitional question of whether the act constitutes treason, or brib-
ery, or a high crime and misdemeanor—can be a dispositive factor in 
how the Senator votes. Although judicial impeachments may shed 
some light on senatorial voting patterns, removing the unitary head of 
the executive branch, in whom all executive power is vested, and par-
ticularly one who has been elected in a free and fair—but also 
partisan—election, creates opportunities for the contemplation of 
partisan politics in ways that judicial impeachments might not.136 As 
a practical matter, then, the issue is the extent to which the norma-
tive removal question is, or ought to be, considered when answering 
the other, primary questions. 
Because of the hodgepodge of approaches taken by Senators in 
presidential impeachments, some of which bleed into one another, it is 
difficult to create a perfect taxonomy. This Article does not purport 
to do so. Nonetheless, three distinct approaches emerge that are rele-
vant to the thesis considered here. One approach may be referred to 
as the Anti-Nullification Approach, which considers only whether fac-
tual allegations have been proven. A second approach may be called 
the Independent Interpretation Approach, in which the Senator may 
engage in a legal determination that differs from that of the House 
with respect to the impeachability of the alleged offense. A third may 
be called the Political Nullification Approach, which is the approach 
that explicitly or implicitly considers the normative value of removal, 
and appears to be the approach that can mimic the more objection-
able aspects of nullification. 
The Anti-Nullification Approach—perhaps it should be called the 
Edmunds Approach—would posit that “convict” has its conventional 
criminal law meaning: It means to find the Party guilty by deter-
mining that the Party committed the acts alleged by the House; 
 
136. Cf. Turley, supra note 54, at 70. Turley examines the history of factional 
disputes in judicial impeachments, and states that such factional disputes 
also exist “in modern cases.” Id. He gives the example of judges subjected 
to calls for impeachment based on their judicial activism. See id.. See also 
Tuan Samahon, Impeachment as Judicial Selection?, 18 Wm. & Mary. 
Bill Rts. J. 595, 598 (2010) (considering whether judicial impeachment 
might be used as a way to “deselect” judges so as to make room for new 
appointments). 
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removal is then incidental to that finding but forms no necessary part 
of it. The only job of the Senate at the verdict-conviction phase is, 
like a criminal jury, to determine the facts: Did the impeached Party 
do what the House alleges in the articles of impeachment? If not, then 
acquittal is required;137 but if so, conviction is required. This ap-
proach, then, would not permit the Senate to engage in any conclu-
sions of law—deferring to the “sole” power of the House to impeach,138 
and thus, on this view, to determine what is impeachable—nor any 
normative judgments about the wisdom of removal, but rather would 
place the Senate in the position of a typical modern criminal jury that 
does not exercise any nullification power. 
A second approach—the Independent Approach—holds that to 
“convict” means to find the Party guilty by determining that the 
Party committed the acts alleged and that those acts constitute trea-
son, bribery, or a high crime and misdemeanor; removal from office is 
then incidental to this finding, and the Senator does not make a dis-
tinct express determination about it. Bloch appears to advocate this 
approach,139 as did Laurence Tribe,140 and Charles Black briefly men-
tions this approach in his impeachment handbook.141 Black says that 
each Senator must answer two questions: “‘Did the president do what 
he is charged in this Article with having done?’ ‘If he did, did that ac-
tion constitute an impeachable offense within the meaning of the con-
stitutional phrase?’”142 Black acknowledges that these questions com-
bine law and fact, such that the Senator is acting as both a judge and 
a fact-finder.143 
In the impeachment context, the Senator using this approach is 
substituting his own interpretation for that of the House, which, by 
submitting the article of impeachment to the Senate, has already de-
termined conclusively, for purposes of fulfilling the House’s role, that 
the alleged conduct is impeachable under Article II, section 4. Again, 
the analogue to nullification here seems awkward. If the Senate pos-
 
137. Of course, a number of Senators concluded during the Clinton 
impeachment that the House failed to establish the President’s factual guilt 
on one or both articles. See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. S1,539 (daily ed. Feb. 
12, 1999) (statement of Sen. Specter); id. at S1,595 (statement of Sen. 
Jeffords); id. at S1,479 (statement of Sen. Biden). 
138. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. 
139. See Bloch, supra note 25, at 159. 
140. See id. at 157 n.71 (noting Tribe’s view as expressed in a New York Times 
piece by David Rosenbaum). 
141. Black, supra note 48, at 13. 
142. Id. 
143. See id. 
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sesses independent power to interpret the meaning of “treason, brib-
ery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,” then its mere disagree-
ment with the House would not seem to be nullification of anything; 
that is, if the House does not have the power to instruct the Senate 
on what constitutional law is binding, then there is nothing to 
“nullify.” Indeed, Hamilton’s defense of the Senate’s role in Federalist 
65 explicitly states that the Senate should not be “tied down by such 
strict rules . . . in the construction of [the alleged offense] by the 
judges[, that is, the Senate].”144 Rather, this approach would only 
constitute nullification if one assumes that in exercising the “sole” 
power of impeachment145 the House necessarily has the sole power of 
giving binding law to the Senate. Even if that is true, then this ap-
proach at least has the virtue of consistency with a view of jury nulli-
fication from the time of the Framing that would have allowed jurors 
to engage in legal interpretation that is at odds with the given law.146 
This would then be objectionable only if the Senator is persuaded that 
the legal judgment is one to be made by the House only, and that the 
Senate may not properly decide what is and is not a high crime or 
misdemeanor. 
A third approach—the Political Nullification Approach—holds 
that “convict” means to determine that the Party has committed an 
act; that the act is treason, bribery or a high crime or misdemeanor; 
and that the impeached party, having committed such an act, should 
be removed from office. This approach differs significantly from the 
other two because it includes a normative judgment, rather than a 
strictly factual or strictly legal determination. This is the approach 
that Senator Byrd and some others urged during the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings.147 Others seemed to engage in distinct de-
liberation upon the question of removal, but it was unclear whether 
they were tying this to the question of impeachability or considering 
 
144. The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 398. 
145. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. 
146. See Carroll, supra note 34, at 588. But see Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry 
Into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial 
America, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 111, 212 (1998) (finding that 
the approach may have varied from state to state, and that it is difficult 
to discern whether there was a generally accepted right of nullification in 
each state). 
147. See, e.g., Byrd, supra note 104; 145 Cong. Rec. S1,479 (daily ed. Feb. 
12, 1999) (statement of Sen. Biden) (voting to acquit based on his view 
that the House failed to prove the alleged offenses, although he discussed 
removal as a distinct consideration); see also Turley, supra note 40, at 
787; Amar, supra note 11, at 307, 311 (arguing that Senators could acquit 
even if they believed that the president did what is alleged, on grounds of 
mercy). 
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it separately.148 The key difficulty with Political Nullification, and the 
one on which this Article focuses, occurs when it is used for raw parti-
sanship or political expediency. But this may be precisely when it is 
most difficult to detect, where partisan or political motivations are 
hidden but nonetheless made effective through other approaches or 
forms of argument.149 
C. Evaluating the Approaches to “Convicting” on Impeachment 
There is a meaningful difference in these various approaches. 
When the House impeaches, it is imposing its constitutional judgment 
that the conduct is worthy of impeachment, conviction, and, neces-
sarily, removal upon conviction. The Anti-Nullification Approach is 
strictly factual and gives absolute deference to the House’s consti-
tutional judgment. If the Senate ought to determine whether to “con-
vict” based on the Political Nullification Approach, then the compari-
son to modern variants of jury nullification is appropriate where a 
Senator decides that the Party is guilty of underlying impeachable 
conduct but should not be removed from office. In both the Inde-
pendent and Political Nullification Approaches, the Senator is reserv-
ing power to dispute the legal judgment of the House. The Independ-
ent Approach, though, stops at this level of discretion. Political 
Nullification goes further by taking issue with the connection between 
conviction for an impeachable offense and removal. For if the party is 
convicted of treason, bribery, or a high crime and misdemeanor, then 
arguably the text already assumes that removal is appropriate.150 The 
Senate need not make this judgment independently because the Con-
stitution has already fixed that consequence. This aspect of Senatorial 
nullification practice is akin to a criminal juror deciding not to convict 
someone of first-degree murder, which the relevant jurisdiction pun-
ishes by a mandatory term of life in prison, because the juror knows 
 
148. See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. S1,555 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of 
Sen. Thompson). Senator Fred Thompson of Tennessee voted to convict 
on Article II, but as to Article I, he found that grand jury perjury had 
been proven but then said, “[t]he question then is whether these examples 
of perjury warrant removal of the President for the commission of high 
crimes and misdemeanors.” Id. “In my opinion,” he said, “these 
statements, while wrong and perhaps indictable after the President leaves 
office, do not justify removal of the President from office.” Id. 
149. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 169, 176 (2000) (discussing 
why it is undesirable for Senators to mask political motivations in 
impeachments). 
150. See 145 Cong. Rec. S1,475 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Lugar) (“With few exceptions, Senators recognize that the Constitution 
gives only one outcome to a verdict of ‘guilty,’ namely, removal from 
office.”). 
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the sentence and does not want the person to serve life in prison—not 
because the defendant did not commit the facts underlying the crime 
and not because the government was unable to prove that a first-de-
gree murder occurred.151 Indeed, in the taxonomy articulated here, 
Political Nullification takes this problem even a step further, if the 
Senator is using her own calculations about her or the President’s 
political fortunes when rendering her decision. A judgment about the 
consequences of a conviction is quite different from a judgment about 
whether to convict in the first instance. 
Political Nullification, then, appears to be less desirable than the 
other approaches when viewed in light of the constitutional text’s re-
quirement that Senators make a decision to “convict,” and in light of 
the institutional role that the Senate plays when it acts as a court of 
impeachment. Of course, there are grounds on which to defend some-
thing like this: first, on a constitutional interpretation that under-
stands the removability question as distinct from the conviction ques-
tion; and second, on the ground that both conviction and remov-
ability should be determined based on higher-level national interests 
rather than any parochial political or electoral concerns.152 After all, 
not all political considerations are created equal.153 
In other words, on one view, political nullification becomes 
legitimate—indeed, it ceases to look like nullification at all—if the 
Senate has the independent constitutional authority to decline to re-
move the president even where there is a finding of guilt for an im-
peachable offense. In the Senate impeachment trial context, though, 
substantial authority suggests that “conviction” and “removal” are 
not distinct concepts, just as the Senate and other legal scholars rec-
ognized when rejecting the bifurcation approach in the Clinton 
impeachment trial.154 A Senator bent on judging the political wisdom 
 
151. For more on this phenomenon, see generally Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment 
Relevant After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries of the 
Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2223 (2010) (discussing the 
phenomenon of nullification where juries know the sentencing options 
available upon conviction). Of course, unlike many jurors, Senators 
already know the consequences of conviction at the time of voting. 
152. See Turley, supra note 40, at 788 (defending “jury nullification” in the 
Senate and separating conviction from removal); Amar, supra note 11, at 
307 (explaining the role of mercy in Senate impeachment judgments). 
153. Cf. Whittington, supra note 61 (distinguishing low, high, and constitutional 
politics during impeachment). 
154. See Bloch, supra note 25, at 157; see also Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 
381–82 (describing the history of Senate voting with respect to separate 
votes on removal and conviction, and finding that the Senate, with the 
impeachment of Judge Halsted Ritter, “concluded then (and has taken the 
position consistently since) that a single vote to convict is all that it is 
required to do constitutionally.”). 
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of removal separately from conviction would have to grapple with 
that authority. Moreover, on another view, “conviction” is so inter-
twined with “removal” that the value of conviction must be deter-
mined in light of the value of removal in the scheme of national inter-
ests. Still, this seems to preclude the exercise of raw, lower-order 
political judgments, those that account for a President’s popularity, a 
lack of desire to see the current Vice-President elevated, or—perhaps 
most often—a calculation about how the Senator’s own electoral for-
tunes would be affected by his vote on articles of impeachment.155 And 
even where “higher” politics inform Political Nullification, it is a con-
cession that the decision whether to convict involves something 
beyond a finding of fact of guilt and a legal judgment about impeach-
ability. The Senator must be prepared to explain why the Consti-
tution permits an acquittal for a president who—in the Senator’s own 
view—has in fact committed an impeachable offense. 
A model based on the Anti-Nullification Approach that requires 
the Senate to simply judge the facts, and that does not permit a judg-
ment as to whether the conduct constitutes a high crime or misde-
meanor, is structurally problematic. This model would make the 
House the exclusive judge of the scope and meaning of the phrase 
“high crimes or misdemeanors,” and would make the Senate bound by 
that constitutional interpretation. There is, of course, a textual argu-
ment for this. If the “sole” power of impeachment lies in the House,156 
and the power of impeachment assumes the exclusive power to deter-
mine what an impeachable offense is, then perhaps it makes some 
sense to say that this is an interpretive job for the House and no other 
body, not even the Senate. One is reminded of then-Representative 
Gerald Ford’s observation that an impeachable offense “is whatever a 
majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given 
moment in history.”157 If Ford was correct—and there is every reason 
to think he was not—then once the House has rendered its “sole” 
judgment as to whether conduct constitutes an impeachable offense, 
then, on this view, the Senate has no role in second-guessing. This 
appears to have been the position of Senator Edmunds during the 
Johnson impeachment.158 
But if this is so, then it binds the Senate in a way that the Senate 
is not otherwise bound by the judgments of the House in any other 
 
155. Cf. Whittington, supra note 61 (examining various forms of political 
considerations on impeachment, but conceding that “low politics” will be 
a factor is an “otherwise justifiable” impeachment). 
156. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. 
157. 116 Cong. Rec. 11,913 (1970) (statement of Rep. Ford). 
158. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., Supp. 424 (1868) (statement of 
Sen. Edmunds). 
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constitutional context. It would also remove an essential legal 
decision-making problem from the Senate’s domain. Aside from ruling 
on legal process questions, the Senate’s only judgment would be 
factual. It also puts the Senate in an untenable position if the facts of 
the underlying conduct are proven by the House managers. This is 
because the Senate would then be bound to affirm the House’s inter-
pretive decision about the nature of the conduct—i.e., whether it is 
impeachable at all—and to remove the official from office, even if the 
conduct was minor and, in the Senate’s judgment, not an impeachable 
offense. The only other recourse under this model would be to vote 
not guilty, even if it were clear that the impeached official had 
committed the underlying conduct. The Anti-Nullification Approach 
therefore could have the pernicious effect of actually inducing 
nullification. 
Moreover, if a court of impeachment really is more a hybrid 
criminal law process, rather than a conventional political one, then 
the Anti-Nullification Approach treats the House as both accuser and 
law-giver. While this may track a conventional grand jury model, it 
does not track a conventional criminal trial model, where the prose-
cutor is not the conclusive law-giver. This is yet another reason why 
this approach may tend to accumulate power in the House in ways 
that could frustrate the Senate’s role. 
The Independent Approach—articulated by Black159 and Bloch,160 
and applied by, among others, Senators Snowe161 and Jeffords162—thus 
emerges as a sensible one when grounded in the notion of what it 
means to “convict” and when combined with the structure of the Sen-
ate in the constitutional design. This approach preserves the quasi-
criminal–quasi-judicial nature of impeachment trials in the Senate, by 
treating the Senate as a court that both finds facts and makes legal 
judgments, as it is entitled to do on motions, for example, in a crimi-
nal law context. And yet this approach also stays true to the act of 
deciding whether to convict—it permits a decision as to the factual 
 
159. Black, supra note 48, at 13. 
160. Bloch, supra note 25, at 159. 
161. 145 Cong. Rec. S1,670-71 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Snowe). 
162. Id. at S1,596–98 (statement of Sen. Jeffords). For another example of this 
approach, as applied in judicial impeachment, see 156 Cong. Rec. S1,022 
(daily ed. Mar. 3, 2010) (statement of Sen. Levin). Senator Carl Levin of 
Michigan voted to convict Judge Porteous, on multiple articles, but not 
on article IV. In the process, Senator Levin stated that “it is up to each of 
us to determine what actions reach the level of impeachable offenses 
egregious enough to remove a federal officer such as a district court 
judge.” Id. 
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basis for the House’s allegations without permitting a separate 
normative judgment about whether removal is appropriate, a decision 
that this approach treats as having already been made, both con-
stitutionally and by the related conclusion that the Party committed 
an impeachable offense. It also gives the Senate the flexibility to make 
judgments about the nature of the conduct at issue to ensure that, 
even if a factual basis for the allegation is established, the Senate still 
makes its own independent judgment as to impeachability. This 
serves to check the ability of the House to engage in vindictive or 
overzealous impeachments. 
Of course, one might question this framework by saying, quite 
rightly, that no Senator would explicitly invoke raw partisanship or 
personal political considerations to justify a vote to acquit, just as no 
Senator would invoke those factors in voting to convict. Political 
Nullification, the argument goes, will always be covert, cloaked in 
some higher-order justification or rationale. Consequently, one might 
argue that one of the other approaches could serve as a convenient 
subterfuge that simply amounts functionally to another form of Poli-
tical Nullification. Senators, pursuant to this argument, could publicly 
answer the question of impeachability or factual guilt in the negative, 
simply because they ultimately believe that the official should not be 
removed from office, even if, in truth, they are privately persuaded of 
both guilt and impeachability. There is merit to these contentions, 
and one imagines that such decision-making likely infected the voting 
in President Clinton’s impeachment trial—perhaps even Senator 
Snowe’s ultimate conclusion is an example of such an approach—or 
President Johnson’s.163 To the extent that true Political Nullification 
will always be covert, we may never know for sure. But to the extent 
that Senators wish to give effect to higher order political concerns, 
doing so through the Independent Approach—judging removability 
through the lens of the “political” crimes model of “high crimes and 
misdemeanors”—seems preferable to doing so through Political 
Nullification. 
Still, some cases are possible in which both factual guilt and im-
peachability will be clear. This would be particularly true where the 
underlying impeachable offense that is alleged is bribery, proof of 
which is far easier to discern because—like treason,164 but unlike the 
 
163. See 145 Cong. Rec. S1,671 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Snowe). 
164. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall 
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, 
giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason 
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on 
Confession in open Court.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012). 
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ill-defined “other high crimes and misdemeanors”—it is previously de-
fined in our criminal law.165 
For example, let us assume that the President is accused of ac-
cepting a bribe in exchange for public support of legislation and a vow 
to sign the legislation when it is approved by Congress. Let us assume 
further that the proof that the President engaged in the conduct is le-
gally sufficient. Let us even further assume that the bribe was in a 
relatively small amount and that it occurred only once, that the 
President has no prior history of accepting or offering bribes, and that 
the President is both popular and performing his other duties capably. 
A Senator might believe that the conduct is sufficiently minor and 
mitigated that it should not result in removal from office. And yet, 
following the Independent Interpretation Approach, the Senator 
would also be compelled to conclude that the conduct amounted to 
bribery, which is plainly impeachable, and thus removable. In such a 
situation, the Senator’s decision to acquit would have to be based on 
nothing more than nullification in its purest form; it could not reason-
ably be based on a failure of proof or a failure to state an impeachable 
offense. 
There are, of course, other ways procedurally to maintain both 
the legal and factual decision-making roles for the Senate without 
compromising on the meaning of “conviction,” if we can say that 
“conviction” means, at a minimum, a factual finding of guilt as it is 
used in the Treason Clause and Thirteenth Amendment. To ensure 
that the Senate has a legal, as well as factual, determination to make 
and is not bound to the House’s determination, the Senate could 
adopt a new procedure. The Senate could adopt a rule which allows it 
to vote, as a threshold matter, on whether the alleged conduct, if 
proven, constitutes treason, bribery, or a high crime and misdemean-
or.166 Then, if a supermajority votes in the affirmative, the trial can 
proceed. If not, the time and energy of an impeachment trial are not 
spent; the Senate could dismiss the articles of impeachment, just like 
a court could dismiss charges against a criminal defendant. 
 
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (defining the crime of bribery and relevant terms). 
166. Akhil Amar suggests something akin to this. See Amar, supra note 11, at 
311. This is not the same as the “Findings of Fact” debate that the 
Senate had during the Clinton impeachment, where the object was to 
approve factual findings that the President engaged in the conduct of 
which he was accused but to do so outside of the context of a vote on 
conviction and removal, thus avoiding the unpopular notion of removing 
him from office while still preserving a record of affirmative findings that 
he had committed the alleged conduct. See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. S1,118 
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (objecting to a vote on 
factual findings). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Conviction, Nullification, and the Limits of Impeachment as Politics 
311 
This is hardly a perfect solution, however. Such a procedure would 
require the Senate to make its legal judgment in the abstract, rather than 
on the particulars of the case. Still, one resolution would be to permit the 
issue to arise again in the form of a subsequent or renewed motion by any 
Senator or by motion of the impeached party. 
So whether the Senate uses a motion-like procedure to exercise its 
legal judgment, or whether it does so by employing something akin to the 
Independent Interpretation Approach articulated here, the Senate still is 
capable of exercising judgment that fits a hybrid political-legal under-
standing of impeachment, without resort to an extra-legal process of Poli-
tical Nullification. 
III. The Limits of Impeachment as Politics 
To defend politically-motivated acquittals on the ground that im-
peachment is inherently “political” is to overstate, if not misstate, the 
political nature of impeachment. 
Recall that Hamilton describes impeachment as political in the 
sense that it involves offenses against the community and governing 
instruments of civil society.167 In Federalist 65 and 66, he also re-
sponded to objections involving giving the Senate the power to try 
impeachments—that, for example, courts would be better repositories 
of such power and that Senate trials would intolerably aggrandize 
senatorial power in the constitutional design.168 To fend off such 
claims, he assured readers that—even knowing that impeachments 
could begin as partisan exercises against a president—Senators can be 
trusted to exercise sound judgment on impeachment, and they will 
avoid corruption.169 Hamilton also referred to the fact that making the 
Senate a court of impeachment was one way in which the Constitu-
tion mixes powers, giving one branch powers that might ordinarily 
belong to another branch.170 While Hamilton never argued that Sena-
tors are exercising the full panoply of judicial power, his argument 
nevertheless implies that when sitting as a court of impeachment, the 
 
167. See The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 394–95; see also Turley, 
supra note 54, at 127–28 (explaining Hamilton’s particular use of the word 
“political”). 
168. See The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 396; The Federalist 
No. 66, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
169. See The Federalist No. 66, supra note 168, at 404-05; see also 
Gerhardt, supra note 40, at 15–16 (discussing the Convention’s approach 
to the vote required for conviction, and explaining that “[t]he delegates 
saw the Senate as composed of well-educated, wealthy, virtuous citizens 
who would be sure to have the Nation’s welfare at heart.”). 
170. See The Federalist No. 66, supra note 168, at 399–400. 
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Senate is transformed—it is assigned “the right of judging,” whereas 
the House has the “right of accusing.”171 Consequently, if the Senate 
were to act, and cast votes, using the same kinds of political calcula-
tions that it uses in performing its ordinary legislative business, there 
would have been no need for Hamilton to refer to the mixture of 
legislative and judicial power in impeachments; indeed, there would 
have been no reason for opponents of this arrangement to object on 
these grounds. The very fact that Senators are acting as judges was 
the basis for the objection to which Hamilton responded, and offers 
ample reason to think that Senators must decide impeachments with-
out reference to ordinary political or electoral considerations. 
Another reason to think this, drawn again from Hamilton and The 
Federalist, has to do with the importance of holding presidents re-
sponsible. In Federalist 70, Hamilton offered his now famous ex-
planation of the need for energy in the executive, a component of 
which is unity.172 Unity is inconsistent with plurality, and a plural 
executive is undesirable in part because it makes responsibility more 
difficult to assess.173 “Responsibility,” Hamilton said, “is of two kinds 
—to censure and to punishment.”174 Hamilton told his readers that 
there must be a mechanism for presidential accountability—holding 
presidents responsible for their misdeeds—but doing so is more 
challenging when there are multiple individuals on whom to shift 
blame.175 A plural executive, then, deprives the people of “the oppor-
tunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the 
persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to 
their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.”176 Hamilton then 
returned to responsibility as he closed his discussion of the executive, 
in Federalist 77: having discussed the “requisites for energy,” does the 
proposed executive have “the requisites to safety, in the republican 
sense—a due dependence on the people, a due responsibility?”177 
Hamilton answered in the affirmative, and cited impeachment as evi-
 
171. See id. at 400. 
172. The Federalist No. 70, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
173. Id. at 427. 
174. Id. at 426. 
175. Id. at 427–28. 
176. Id. at 427. 
177. The Federalist No. 77, at 462 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
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dence of the Constitution’s safeguards for presidential responsibility.178 
If a Senator believes that the President has committed an act that is 
legitimately impeachable, then acquittal based on raw politics or 
electoral calculations undermines the Senate’s role in assuring re-
sponsibility in the unitary executive. This, in turn, enables presidents 
in their misconduct179 and threatens the ability of the legislature to 
resist accumulations of presidential power. This is especially problem-
atic if presidents attempt to use their position to influence Senate 
voting, such as by staging rallies in the Senator’s home state or other-
wise developing a base of popular support that could sway individual 
Senators based on raw politics. 
Senator Harkin’s view, then, may go too far in the other direction. 
For when sitting as a court of impeachment, the Senate is trans-
formed. It is still a political body, but it is not the same kind of poli-
tical body as it normally is when its sits as a deliberative legislative 
body. The normal incidents of politics, and political judgments, would 
seem not to obtain when sitting for impeachment purposes.180 This is 
particularly true once one considers the mandates of the constitution-
al text with respect to impeachments, including that the party must 
be “convicted” with a supermajority of the Senate. Remember also 
that when the impeachment clauses were initially discussed at the 
Constitutional Convention, leading Framers like George Mason and 
Elbridge Gerry wanted to add “maladministration” to the text as a 
basis for impeachment.181 But that suggestion was defeated upon the 
urging of James Madison, who thought that such a term would simply 
permit “tenure during pleasure of the Senate.”182 This rejection in the 
language of impeachment—well-covered in the impeachment litera-
ture—was designed to prevent impeachment from being a device for 
removal upon mere political disagreement or petty conduct by the im-
peached Party.183 The Framers desired a standard less subject to 
political or partisan manipulation. Recall also that the Framers took 
care to make the Senate different than the House—more deliberative, 
 
178. Id.; see also Gerhardt, supra note 40, at 93 (“By its very nature, the 
impeachment process is reserved for Congress to demand an accounting 
from the President regarding alleged abuses of his powers.”). 
179. See Whittington, supra note 61 (stating that if the “big stick” of 
impeachment is unused, “Congress might find that some who hold an 
office of trust under the United States are emboldened to behave badly”). 
180. See Tulis, supra note 57, at 237. 
181. See 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 550 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
182. Id. For more on the history of the debates over language in the 
impeachment clauses, see Gerhardt, supra note 20, at 606–609. 
183. See Berger, supra note 11, at 89–90; Black, supra note 48, at 30. 
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more distant from popular passion and sentiment184—though some of 
this was compromised by the Seventeenth Amendment.185 Structur-
ally, then, the Senate is positioned to deliberate soberly and objective-
ly as to the facts of an impeachment and the constitutional standard 
for impeachment. The formalities—quasi-legal, and even quasi-
criminal—that the Framers devised for grappling with the subject of 
impeachment would have been unnecessary if impeachment were to be 
treated the same as any other legislative or political moment for the 
Senate. And if raw partisanship ought not to be a reason for im-
peachment, conviction, and removal, then, arguably, neither should 
raw partisanship be a basis for acquittal. 
This is not to say that we can cleanse impeachment trials of all 
partisan political considerations. Neal Katyal recognized this reality 
and wrote that, “[p]olitics is inevitable in these high-stakes impeach-
ment debates. And this is how it should be.”186 Katyal does not de-
mand partisanship in impeachment decision-making, but rather is 
contending that it is dangerous for moral, legal, and historical appeals 
to mask ordinary political motivations.187 He is rightly concerned 
about senatorial responsibility, and grounds his argument in the dis-
tinction between the judiciary and the Senate as a representative 
body.188 Senators should, as Katyal notes, be transparent about poli-
tical motivations. But, as Turley argues, the structural and procedural 
mechanisms of impeachment offer a forum in which Senators can be 
open about politics, but where the deliberative process can induce 
Senators to use factual and legal judgments that override strictly par-
tisan or politically expedient ones.189 Senators, then, may—and likely 
will—bring their partisan or electoral concerns to the table at the 
trial’s inception. But they should ultimately seek to subordinate those 
motivations to higher-order concerns about guilt, constitutionalism, 
and presidential responsibility. 
Of course, one hopes that Senators could conduct all legislative 
business in a manner that will “refine and enlarge the public view,”190 
 
184. See The Federalist No. 63, at 381–82 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). 
185. See U.S. Const. amend. XVII (making Senators popularly elected). 
186. See Katyal, supra note 149, at 176. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 176–77. 
189. See Turley, supra note 54, at 128. Cf. Whittington, supra note 61 
(distinguishing low, high, and constitutional politics, and stating that even 
low politics will be factors in judging an otherwise justifiable 
impeachment). 
190. The Federalist No. 10, at 76 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
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as Madison described it, and that Senators will “best discern the true 
interest of their country” and not sacrifice it to “temporary or partial 
considerations.”191 But the special nature of impeachment renders this 
notion even more critical when Senators sit for that great purpose. 
Conclusion 
Although impeachment is political, it is important not to over-
state its political nature. While Senator Harkin correctly said that 
those who sit in judgment during an impeachment trial are “Senators” 
and not strictly “jurors,” their senatorial attributes are now different 
from those that attend ordinary legislative business. Of course, let us 
not be naïve: perhaps Senators will do what they wish on impeach-
ment, particularly when they have little or no disincentive to make it 
up as they go. But Senators ought to adhere to a standard that is 
most consistent with the constitutional text and the structure of the 
Senate, which is transformed into a quasi-judicial body that deter-
mines facts and applies principles of constitutional and criminal law. 
Such a process demands more uniformity and consistency, not less. 
While the ultimate judgment may well rest within each Senator’s con-
science, the Senator’s task on impeachment trials need not be wholly 
subjectivized nor politicized. Within a constitutional design that 
transforms the Senate into a quasi-judicial body, political nullification 
by a court of impeachment—whether overt or covert—can do violence 
to the rule of law, presidential responsibility, the institutional integ-
rity of the Senate, and the separation of powers. 
 
 
191. Id. 
